Follow the Structure, Not the Forecast: How the 2025–2027 U.S. Market Will Shift Money—and Who Will Win

Trump, the Fed, Tariffs, and Interest Rates—Where Is the Money Flowing?

Introduction: Now Is the Time to Track Structure, Not Direction

In 2025, asset markets can no longer be explained by simple interest rate forecasts or short-term reactions to policy announcements.
Trump’s high tariffs, the Fed’s QT, the U.S.–China tech war, a rebound in inflation expectations, a mismatch in Treasury supply and demand, and rising geopolitical risks—all these factors do not move independently.
They are interconnected, forming a complex capital flow structure that reshapes the entire asset market.

This report summarizes six of these structural drivers and organizes the causal relationships behind them.

The goal of this summary is clear.
It does not ask simply, “What happened?”
Instead, it examines: “Why did it happen? Whose profit or loss did it lead to? And how should we respond?”
The analysis is grounded in structural thinking.

1. Trump Tariffs: A Political Lever Shaking the Entire Asset Market

In April 2025, the Trump administration imposed a flat 10% tariff on all imports.
It also announced punitive tariffs of up to 145% on certain Chinese goods.
This was not merely a move to adjust the trade balance.
It was a major structural shock with cascading effects on market valuation, interest rates, and capital flow.

1.1 Tariff Timing and Political Calendar

Trump is strategically using tariffs with midterms and reelection in mind.
The timing of deferrals and impositions is not based on economic logic.
It is determined by political approval ratings and electoral calculations.
As a result, markets repeatedly face uncertainty and volatility.
Unstable administrative measures—such as announcing tariffs, then granting 90-day deferrals, excluding some products, then reimposing higher tariffs—have further amplified supply chain risks.

1.2 Supply Chain and Tech Sector Interconnection

Tariffs directly increase the cost of imported raw materials and finished goods, squeezing profit margins for U.S. companies.
Tech firms are especially vulnerable due to their reliance on Chinese components and assembly.
Once tariffs are applied, they enter a structural cycle:
Rising production costs → Higher sale prices → Weakened demand → Profit decline → Share price drop.

In 2025, longer GPU and server lead times and rising component costs have led major tech companies to lower their forward guidance.
As a result, EPS forecasts for NASDAQ 100 companies have been revised down by 0.5 to 0.8 percentage points annually.
This is not a temporary shock, but a structural drag on earnings due to tariffs.

1.3 Tariff-Driven Inflation and Rate Shock

Tariffs also fuel inflation.
Rising import prices → Higher CPI/PCE → Rebound in inflation expectations → Rising Treasury yields.
This chain reaction increases tech stock discount rates → Falling PER → Market correction.
As yields surge, existing bondholders suffer valuation losses, while investors rotate toward perceived safe havens like gold and TIPS.

From Q2 to Q3 2025, CPI is projected to rise an additional 0.3 to 0.4 percentage points due to tariff effects.
This further intensifies upward pressure on nominal yields.

1.4 China’s Treasury Selling and Global Shock

China has retaliated by cutting its holdings of U.S. Treasuries or skipping auctions.
In April 2025, rumors of Chinese selling drove the 10Y yield sharply higher in two days, and the 30Y yield breached 5%.
It marked the biggest spike since 2001.

1.5 Causal Flow Summary

High tariffs → Higher supply chain costs → Falling tech profits
Rising import prices → Higher inflation expectations → Rate spike
Concerns over Chinese Treasury selling → Weak Treasury auctions → Yield surge
Risk asset sell-off + gold and dollar strength → Accelerated capital shifts

Profit and Loss Structure:

Loss (L): Importers, tech stockholders, bondholders
Profit (P): U.S. government (tariff revenue), gold holders, short-position investors

Tariffs have done more than raise import prices.
They have lifted discount rates in the equity market, pressured bond prices downward, and reshaped demand for safe-haven assets—triggering a broad capital reallocation.

2. Fed Monetary Policy: A Paradoxical Structure Where Rates Fall, but Yields Rise

In the second half of 2024, the Fed began a rate-cutting cycle.
However, the market pushed long-term yields higher.
This unusual steepening of the yield curve was not driven by policy expectations.
It reflected structural distrust and supply pressure.

2.1 Long-Term Yields Rose Despite Rate Cuts

The policy rate fell from 5.5% in September 2024 to 4.25% by January 2025.
Yet the 10Y Treasury yield rose from 3.6% to 4.48%.
This contradicts past cycles, where long-term yields typically fell by an average of 26 basis points.

This suggests the market does not trust the Fed’s cuts or believes they are unsustainable.
More importantly, the rise in the term premium shows that the market is pricing in deeper structural risks, not just reacting to policy.

2.2 Real Yield Increase and Loss of Confidence

Even as the Fed cut rates, real yields rose.
Markets judged that further cuts were not credible.
With inflation expectations still unsettled, the rate cuts hurt the Fed’s credibility.
TIPS-based real yields reached +2.0%, the highest since 2009.

As of April 2025, the real yield on 10Y TIPS stands at 2.16%.
This means the true cost of capital remains historically high—despite nominal rate cuts.

2.3 QT and Long-End Supply Pressure

The Fed continues its Quantitative Tightening (QT).
It is no longer reinvesting up to $60 billion in maturing Treasuries monthly.
This has increased Treasury supply, while demand is weakening.
As a result, private investors now require higher yields.
This is a structural factor locking long-term rates at higher levels.

With foreign demand declining and the Fed out of the picture, required market yields are rising rapidly.
QT has created a vacuum in demand, further anchoring the upper bound of long-term yields.

2.4 Causal Flow Summary

Fed begins rate cuts → Market limits easing expectations → Re-tightening risk priced in
Real yields rise + liquidity withdrawal continues → 10Y yield rebounds
QT continues → Lower institutional demand → Worsening supply-demand imbalance
Term premium rises → Long-term yields stay elevated

Profit and Loss Structure:

Loss (L): Existing bondholders, long-duration tech stock investors
Profit (P): New buyers of high-yield bonds, investors who positioned against the Fed

QT means the Fed is buying fewer Treasuries.
This creates continued selling pressure on bonds.
So even as the Fed lowers rates, market yields rise.

This is not just about expectations.
It reflects a mix of structural imbalances:
supply shocks, credibility erosion, weak external demand, and unstable inflation expectations.

When both real yields and term premiums rise together, Fed cuts become a market burden—not a relief.

3. U.S.–China Tech War and TikTok: Where Geopolitics and Election Strategy Intersect

At first glance, the push to ban TikTok seemed like a win for U.S. social media companies.
Platforms like Meta and YouTube gained ad share and saw short-term benefit.
But this was only the tip of the iceberg.
TikTok has now evolved from a trade or security issue into a strategic political asset in the U.S. election landscape.

3.1 Symbolic and Strategic Value of TikTok in the Trade War

In 2025, as the Trump administration implemented broad high tariffs, TikTok again became the center of regulation and divestment debate.
Under the 2024 “Protect Against Foreign Adversary Controlled Applications Act (PAFACA),” ByteDance faces a ban unless it divests TikTok’s U.S. operations.
Yet, President Trump used executive authority to delay the enforcement by 90 days.

This move is not a tech regulation—it is political strategy.
Trump used TikTok heavily in his 2024 campaign.
Republican campaign teams reported that TikTok generated billions of views among young voters.
TikTok’s user base and Republican support base significantly overlap.
It is optimized for youth outreach and mass message broadcasting.

Meanwhile, although Meta and YouTube initially gained ad revenue, recent earnings reports show that this effect has started to fade.
The competitive advantage was short-lived.
Now, TikTok’s role as a geopolitical symbol and campaign infrastructure is more important than its short-term market impact.

3.2 Algorithm Differences and Message Amplification

TikTok’s algorithm is fundamentally different from YouTube’s.
YouTube delivers content based on individual preferences.
TikTok pushes identical content to user groups with shared identity.
This group-based targeting fits perfectly with Republican messaging strategies.
In short, TikTok gives Trump a powerful algorithmic infrastructure for mass persuasion.

Since 2020, China has included such recommendation algorithms in its “AI export control list.”
This is one reason the U.S. tightened regulations.
Inside the U.S., however, the real concern is not data privacy—it’s TikTok’s ability to distribute political messaging at scale.

3.3 China’s Strategy: Bargaining Chip and Shock Absorber

China does not treat TikTok as a simple business issue.
President Xi rarely intervenes directly in diplomatic matters.
Instead, lower-tier officials handle negotiations.
TikTok serves as a signaling device in U.S.–China trade talks.
Negotiations over divestment or separation could act as informal buffers to ease rising tensions.

3.4 Domestic Policy Coordination: The Trump–Bessent–Powell Triangle

TikTok is part of broader coordination across trade, fiscal, and monetary policy.
Trump wants to keep TikTok active for campaign advantage.
Treasury Secretary Bessent serves as a buffer between Trump and the Fed.
Trump has voiced concern about being blamed—like Herbert Hoover—for a market crash.
He has experienced the “pain threshold” of political damage from soaring bond yields.
In response, Bessent coordinated with the Fed and offered verbal support for liquidity tools—similar to QE—to calm markets.

Bessent also signaled readiness to raise the debt ceiling.
If Republicans control both chambers, they may pass it through budget reconciliation.
Thus, the TikTok issue is not just about tech or trade.
It is deeply embedded in Trump’s political survival and the joint management of fiscal and monetary tools.

3.5 Causal Flow Summary

TikTok ban law (2024) → China protests → U.S.–China trade talks stall
Trump’s 90-day extension → Republicans secure campaign platform
TikTok algorithm → Group-based message delivery optimization
Flexible divestment talks → Used as a card to ease tensions
Bessent as buffer → Supports market stability + Trump approval ratings

Profit and Loss Structure:

Loss (L): U.S.-listed tech firms with China exposure, heavily regulated firms, Treasury holders (if talks break down)
Profit (P): U.S. social media platforms (ad revenue), Republican political campaigns using TikTok, algorithm-based data companies, short-position traders
NASDAQ tech giants, Treasury holders: Loss (L)
U.S. SNS firms, short-sellers: Profit (P)

Tech decoupling is not a short-term event.
It is a long-term driver that may compress valuations for U.S. tech stocks for years to come.

4. U.S. Treasury Supply–Demand Imbalance: Even Dealers Refused the 30-Year

The U.S. Treasury market is facing a near-breakdown in structural supply-demand balance.
The Fed’s QT, reduced foreign demand, and expanded fiscal spending have collided—creating a severe gap between supply and demand.

4.1 Chronic Fiscal Deficits and Net Issuance Surge

In 2025, the U.S. government is increasing infrastructure, defense, and welfare spending while keeping tax cuts in place.
As a result, the federal deficit reached 6.4% of GDP in 2024, and net Treasury issuance is expected to remain in the hundreds of billions per year through 2027.
This points to structurally rising supply.

This tax–spend imbalance reflects not just stimulus but a core feature of Trump’s fiscal and political strategy.
Running simultaneous tax cuts and spending increases leads to structural Treasury oversupply.

4.2 Demand Collapse: The Fed and Foreign Buyers Exit

On the demand side, traditional buyers are pulling back.
The Fed has stopped reinvesting maturing Treasuries since 2022 through QT.
Meanwhile, central banks in China and Japan are reducing their holdings for geopolitical and currency stabilization reasons.
China, in particular, has effectively exited the U.S. Treasury market in 2025—skipping auctions and allowing bonds to roll off.

As of April 2025, China’s U.S. Treasury holdings may have dropped below $700 billion.
This is a clear signal of structural demand erosion, and possibly a retaliatory move against Trump’s tariffs and tech export bans.

4.3 Auction Failures and Private Sector Absorption Limits

With fewer institutional buyers, the private sector is forced to absorb more supply.
But unless yields rise enough, the market refuses to buy.
In the October 2024 30Y auction, primary dealers had to buy 18% of the issuance—far above the 11% norm.
This shows weak end-user demand.
The bid-to-cover ratio dropped to 2.3, and the tail—the spread above market rates—widened by 3 bps.

In the April 17, 2025 20Y auction, the tail hit 6.3 bps—the worst result since 2023.
The bid-to-cover ratio remained weak at 2.45, showing widespread market reluctance.
This signals a deeper breakdown in the Treasury market’s structural equilibrium.

Upcoming large refinancing rounds in May and the September quarterly auctions are now seen as the next possible stress points.

4.4 Sticky Upper Bound on Yields and Equity Market Pressure

This supply-demand mismatch places upward pressure on bond yields.
Long-term rates are set by the market’s ability to absorb supply.
Until demand returns, higher yields are required.
This negatively impacts equities.
As risk-free rates rise, discount rates rise, and PERs fall.
Tech stocks with 1–2% dividend yields cannot compete with 10Y yields near 5%.

High-PER growth stocks face structural disadvantages.
Equity market risk premiums are expanding as a result.

4.5 Debt Ceiling and Policy Response: The Fed as Last Resort

In early 2025, Treasury Secretary Bessent said the administration is ready to raise the debt ceiling.
If Republicans control both chambers, it may pass via reconciliation.
Still, markets expect the Fed to re-enter as a liquidity provider in the event of disruption—via quasi-QE or backstop tools.

Though monetary and fiscal policy are formally independent, coordination is becoming more common to mitigate bond market stress.
This reflects growing policy entanglement in U.S. financial markets.

4.6 Causal Flow Summary

Fiscal deficit continues → Net Treasury issuance rises → Supply glut
QT continues + foreign demand declines → Traditional buyers exit
Private absorption burden rises → Yields rise → Higher equity discount rates
Auction failures → Higher tail yields → Imbalance deepens

Profit and Loss Structure:

Loss (L): Existing bondholders (price decline), holders of high-PER growth stocks (discount rate pressure)
Profit (P): New buyers of high-yield Treasuries, short-position investors, traders expecting a reversal in tightening

U.S. Treasuries are no longer unconditional safe havens.
Now, new buyers set the price, and existing holders take the losses.

With rising deficits, QT, and fading foreign demand, the Treasury market is trapped in structural mismatch.

Causal Flow Recap:

Net issuance increases → Fed and foreign buyers exit → Private sector burden increases
Auction failures → Tail yields rise, bid-to-cover ratios fall
Rising yields → Valuation pressure on equities

Profit and Loss Structure:

Loss (L): Legacy bondholders, growth stock investors
Profit (P): High-yield Treasury buyers, equity short-covering traders

Until yields rise enough to attract demand, the market will punish old holders and reward new capital.
This is a classic wealth transfer structure.

5. Inflation Expectations and TIPS Yields: Tarifflation and the Inversion of Discount Structures

In 2025, the fastest-spreading sentiment in U.S. markets was the fear that “inflation may not come down easily.”
This anxiety was fueled by Trump’s high-tariff policy—Tarifflation.
It triggered not just price increases but a structural rise in inflation expectations, leading to a repricing of discount rates across both bond and equity markets.

5.1 Sharp Rise in Consumer Expectations and Market Sentiment Shift

In April 2025, the University of Michigan’s consumer sentiment survey showed 1-year inflation expectations jumping to 6.7%—the highest since 1981.
Just one month earlier, it was 5.0%.
Consumers feared not only rising import prices but also policy paralysis.
This sharp change pushed short-term breakeven inflation (BEI) higher—5Y BEI surpassed 2.7%.

From Q2 to Q3 2025, CPI is projected to rise by an additional 0.3 to 0.4 percentage points, reflecting full tariff pass-through.
This marks the beginning of structurally anchored inflation expectations—not just a temporary overshoot.

5.2 Nominal Yield Response: BEI and Real Yields Rising Together

Nominal Treasury yields consist of real yield + inflation expectations.
When BEI rises, nominal yields must also rise.
After April 2025, as 10Y BEI jumped from ~2.0% to 2.7%, nominal 10Y yields followed suit.

The real issue: TIPS-based real yields also remained elevated—around +2.0%.
This meant that short-term inflation fears were locking in a structurally high ceiling for long-term rates.

As of April 2025:

10Y nominal yield ≈ 4.35%
10Y TIPS real yield = 2.16%
→ Implied 10Y BEI ≈ 2.19%
This shows that the market fully internalizes the durability of inflation pressure.

5.3 Fed Constraints: The Limits of Dovish Policy

The Fed began easing rates in H2 2024 to support the economy.
But rising inflation expectations have undercut its credibility.
With inflation bouncing back, the Fed faces limited room to cut further.
TIPS yields are rising, and BEI is also climbing.
That puts additional upward pressure on real yields, making further rate cuts politically and economically difficult.

In effect, we now face a scenario where “the Fed is cutting, but the market is tightening.”
This duality structurally raises discount rates across all asset classes.

5.4 Transmission to Stocks: PER Compression and Multiple Risk

Higher inflation expectations raise cost pressures and profit uncertainty.
Simultaneously, higher discount rates reduce the present value of future cash flows.
This hits tech and high-PER growth stocks the hardest.
Their valuations rely more on expectations than on current earnings.
Since April 2025, PERs across NASDAQ 100 stocks have been adjusted downward.
The multiple compression is not sentiment-driven—it reflects higher structural discounting.

5.5 TIPS as a Defensive Asset: Profit Shift from Nominals

Rising inflation expectations favor TIPS holders.
TIPS principal adjusts with actual CPI, making them more resilient.
Meanwhile, nominal bondholders suffer as yields rise and prices fall.

TIPS outperform nominal bonds during inflation shocks, creating a clear profit–loss divergence between the two.

For investors, this is more than a data point.
It’s a portfolio-wide trigger for capital reallocation.

5.6 Causal Flow Summary

High tariffs imposed → Import prices rise → Consumer inflation expectations surge
Inflation rebound → BEI rises → Nominal yields increase
Sticky real yields + rising BEI → Limits to Fed easing
Discount rates rise → Tech PER falls → Equity correction
Nominal bond losses (L), TIPS outperformance (P)

Profit and Loss Structure:

Profit (P): TIPS holders, gold holders, short-position investors
Loss (L): Nominal bondholders, high-PER tech investors, those betting on Fed credibility

Inflation expectations are not just numbers.
They shape market psychology, policy flexibility, discount rates, and P&L structures.

Tarifflation is now a structural determinant of who gains and who loses across bonds and stocks.

Trump’s tariff policy has pushed inflation expectations sharply higher.

Flow Summary:

Consumer inflation expectations spike (6.7%) → 10Y BEI rises → Nominal yields increase
TIPS principal adjusts upward → Becomes defensive asset
Higher inflation expectations → Limits Fed’s policy room → Long-term yield ceiling holds firm

Profit and Loss Recap:

TIPS holders, gold investors: Profit (P)
Nominal bondholders, growth stock investors: Loss (L)

As inflation expectations rise, the Fed cannot stay dovish.
This pushes market interest rate expectations higher—redefining the entire rate structure.

6. Global Liquidity and Geopolitical Risk: Capital Can Reverse Direction Instantly

The final structural pillar amplifying U.S. market volatility is global liquidity and geopolitical risk.
This is a meta-structure that influences all previous components.
When certain events occur, it has the power to instantly reverse capital flows across assets.

6.1 Geopolitical Shocks and the Traditional Safe-Haven Rotation

The war in Ukraine, Middle East conflict, Taiwan Strait tension, and EM financial instability continue to shake markets in 2025.
These shocks act as classic risk-off triggers.
Capital flows into safe assets like U.S. Treasuries, the dollar, and gold.
Treasuries rally (yields fall), while equities face selloffs.
This is the typical “UST (P) – Equities (L)” outcome.

But this traditional pattern breaks down when the source of the crisis is the U.S. itself.

6.2 When the Crisis Originates in the U.S.

If the U.S. is the epicenter, the safe-haven logic fails.
For example, Trump’s high-tariff policies intensify global trade wars.
Foreign demand for U.S. Treasuries weakens.
Instead of rallying, Treasuries are sold off.

In April 2025, China skipped a Treasury auction.
The result: auction failure and surging yields.
Capital rotated into gold and the yen—alternative safe havens.
The dollar weakened, and U.S. assets became targets of broad avoidance.

This marked a paradigm shift: U.S. Treasuries are no longer immune during U.S.-led disruptions.

6.3 Global Capital Flow Divergence

Global liquidity shifts direction based on central bank divergence.
As of 2025:

The U.S. is slowly easing rates.
Europe continues tightening.
Japan has ended easing and begun raising rates.

Capital now moves to regions with rate advantage.
This weakens the relative appeal of U.S. Treasuries, raising upward pressure on yields.

Japan’s rate hikes encourage repatriation by institutional investors, reducing their UST demand further.

Notably, during a late April 2025 Treasury primary dealer meeting, stablecoin-based Treasury demand was highlighted as an emerging variable.
If coupled with regulatory easing, this could partially offset declining foreign demand.

6.4 Global Leverage and Sudden Shocks

Yen carry trades and cross-border leveraged positions distort market relationships.
When the BOJ raised rates in Q2 2025, carry trades unwound.
Global bond yields spiked.
Stocks corrected broadly.

These sudden liquidations don’t follow macro logic.
They are flow-driven volatility bursts, triggering sharp moves in long yields and equity drawdowns.

Leveraged credit funds once anchored in long-dated U.S. assets now rotate aggressively—sometimes even pulling out entirely—shaking market confidence at its core.

6.5 De-Dollarization and Declining Foreign Demand

BRICS and Gulf nations are changing their FX reserve strategies.
Demand for dollar assets is shrinking.
U.S. Treasuries once enjoyed a convenience yield due to reserve currency status.
As this erodes, Treasury yields structurally rise.

China is tying strategic issues like AI export bans and rare earth supply to its UST holdings.
This creates a direct threat to the credibility of the U.S. bond market.

Meanwhile, the share of trade settled in dollars is falling.
Yuan, rubles, and riyals are gaining ground—especially in commodity payments.
De-dollarization is no longer theory—it’s now a visible shift in capital allocation.

6.6 Causal Flow Summary

Geopolitical shock → Global risk-off → UST (P), Equities (L)
If U.S. is the source → UST sell-off → Dollar weakens, gold/yen strengthen
Global rate divergence → Capital exits U.S. → Treasury sell pressure
Leverage unwind → Spikes in rates and stock volatility
De-dollarization → Structural decline in foreign UST demand → Sticky yield ceiling

Profit and Loss Structure:

Profit (P): Gold holders, yen-based assets, short-sellers, TIPS investors
Loss (L): U.S. bondholders, growth stockholders, leveraged ETF holders

Global liquidity is not a simple flow.
It either amplifies or neutralizes the prior five structural forces.
Markets have now learned that even U.S. Treasuries are not always safe.
Conventional asset relationships no longer hold.

This pillar carries the highest short-term destructive power, especially during unexpected global or U.S.-origin events.

In 2025, capital is no longer staying in the U.S.
With wars, pandemic risks, geopolitics, and tightening global liquidity, Risk-on/Risk-off shifts constantly.

And when the shock starts in America, even Treasuries are dumped.
Dollar weakness, failed auctions, and global diversification are the new norms.

Conclusion: Structural Flow Tracking Strategy – What Investors Must Do Now

From 2025 to 2027, we are not in a normal economic cycle.
We are in a structural transition.
It is no longer useful to ask, “Will rates go up or down?” or “Should I buy or sell stocks?”
Instead, we must ask:
Which structural shifts are creating profit and loss—and for whom?

The six structural axes discussed in this report interact with each other.
Each change creates a domino effect on asset prices and shifts the P&L structure.

As investors, the goal is not to guess direction.
It is to identify who wins and who loses—and position on the profitable side before the capital moves.

Key Takeaways – What You Must Know Now:

Stronger tariff policy raises supply chain costs, drives inflation higher, and spikes interest rates.
This hurts tech stocks and bondholders, while benefiting gold, TIPS, and short-sellers.
Fed rate cuts trigger a paradoxical rise in long-term yields, damaging bond portfolios.
Higher real rates hurt equities structurally.
TikTok and tech decoupling cause long-term valuation discounts for U.S. tech stocks.
Yet, platforms like TikTok become key tools in political messaging strategies.
Treasury supply-demand imbalance breaks the “safe-haven” narrative.
Private investors demand higher yields, anchoring long-term rates and pressuring stock valuations.
Inflation expectations drive nominal yields up and constrain the Fed’s policy space.
TIPS and gold benefit, while nominal bonds and tech stocks suffer.
Global liquidity and geopolitics act as a meta-structure—amplifying or breaking all five forces.
When the crisis begins in the U.S., even Treasuries are sold.
Diversified global positioning is now essential.

So What Should You Do?

1. Lead the Structure, Don’t Follow the Direction.

Don’t try to guess interest rate direction.
Position in assets that profit when rates rise.
Capital will always move toward the P&L winner.
Be there before the shift starts.

2. Reduce Tech Exposure. Increase Defensive and Inflation-Linked Assets.

Tech stocks face ongoing PER compression.
Valuation cuts are structural.
TIPS, gold, and real assets (like silver) benefit when real yields rise and inflation expectations stay high.

3. Separate Old Bonds and New Bonds. Don’t Treat Them the Same.

Legacy long-duration bonds are in loss territory. Restructure them.
For new purchases, buy high-yield Treasuries in tranches.
Watch for signs of a rate ceiling to enter.
As of April 2025, if QT continues, yields below 4.2% on 10Y Treasuries are considered exit or trim zones.

4. Use Event-Driven Short Strategies as Core Tactical Assets.

CPI releases, Treasury auctions, FOMC meetings, and China’s FX policy are structural trigger points.
Don’t trade direction—trade capital rotation around structural transitions.
Shorts based on structure, not price alone, are powerful right now.

5. Move Beyond U.S.-Centric Portfolios—Deploy a Global Structural Allocation.

Track capital flows into Europe, Japan, BRICS, and commodity nations.
If the shock originates from the U.S., even Treasuries fail as safe assets.
In that case, gold, yen, and physical commodity ETFs become better anchors.

6. Sharpen Your P&L Awareness. Track Who’s Winning and Losing.

Every asset is someone’s profit (P) and someone else’s loss (L).
The first reaction to structural change is always a P&L transfer.
Follow the money, not the narrative.

7. Interpret Policy and Media Signals Structurally, Not Literally.

Fed statements, Treasury interviews, or China’s off-the-record actions aren’t random.
They are previews of structural shifts.
Ask: “Why did this statement happen now?”
That’s how you detect the shift early.

Final Note

From 2025 to 2027, we must track structure—not predict outcomes.
Tariffs, rates, tech, Treasuries, inflation, liquidity.
These six axes are redefining the profit–loss structure of every asset class.

At the center of structure is money.
And money always moves to where the profit–loss gap is greatest.

There is only one thing we must do:

Position ourselves at the P&L fault line—before it moves.